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The End of Special Treatment for
Cubans in the U.S. Immigration System:
Consequences and Solutions for Cubans
with Final Orders of Removal
Lindsay Daniels*
ABSTRACT
In January 2016, former President Obama announced the end
of the “Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot” Policy, which granted special immigra-
tion benefits to Cuban migrants.  As part of the agreement to end
this policy, the Cuban government agreed to take back its citizens
with final orders of removal for criminal convictions, an action that
it had refused to take for decades.  This Comment will begin by
exploring past and present immigration policies between the United
States and Cuba, including recent developments like the normaliza-
tion of relations and the impact of President Trump’s immigration
policies.
This Comment will then explore possible avenues of relief for
the over 34,000 Cubans who have final orders of removal for con-
victions that are often minor or decades old, but who are suddenly
at risk for deportation.  First, this Comment will argue that the De-
partment of Homeland Security should exercise discretion in depor-
tation priorities in a humanitarian fashion through a weighing of
positive and negative factors and by filing joint motions to reopen
when appropriate.  Next, this Comment will discuss the possibility
for some Cubans to argue ineffective assistance of counsel under a
Padilla v. Kentucky analysis, due to the potential confusion about
Cuba-specific immigration law by non-immigration attorneys han-
dling criminal cases.  Finally, this Comment will discuss the possible
fear-based claims that a Cuban might successfully make based upon
Cuba’s poor human rights record and political turmoil.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 2018.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2017, then-President Obama announced that in
addition to ending the United States’ “Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot” Policy1
toward Cuba, Cuba would begin accepting back its deportable citi-
zens from the United States on a “case-by-case” basis.2  This an-
nouncement made uncertain the fate of the more than 34,000
Cuban nationals living in the United States with final orders of re-
moval,3 but whom Cuba had thus far refused to take back.4  While
most people would agree that the dangerous criminals5 should be
deported,6 the agreement also puts at risk a more sympathetic class
of Cubans who were convicted of non-violent crimes years or de-
cades ago and who have since created productive lives in the
United States.7
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the options that
sympathetic Cuban immigrants with final orders of removal have in
1. See infra Part II.E.1.
2. Joint Statement, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://bit.ly/
2m8BVXX.  The Deputy Director of the U.S. Section of the Cuban Foreign Minis-
try said that as a result of the joint statement with the United States, the Cuban
government will consider whether its citizens have “broken law” and “can no
longer remain” in the United States in determining who to take back.  Jay Weaver
& Mimi Whitefield, Some Cuban Felons, Including 2,000 Murderers, Could Face
Deportation Under New Policy, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 13, 2017), http://hrld.us/
2lCuMBt.
3. Lizette Alvarez & Kristin Hussey, Cubans Convicted in the U.S. Face New
Fears of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1J0A9M9.  A de-
portation order is considered “final” when the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) affirms the order or the time period expires “in which the alien is permitted
to seek review” of the order.  8 U.S.C. § (47)(B) (2012).
4. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
5. About 2,000 Cuban nationals live in the United States who have been con-
victed of murder, although it is unclear how many of them have been issued final
orders of removal. See Weaver & Whitefield, supra note 2.
6. 19 percent of Americans believe that the United States should deport all
undocumented immigrants regardless of criminal background, 22 percent believe
that the United States should deport only those who have committed any crime,
and 53 percent believe the United States should deport only those who have com-
mitted serious crimes.  Tim Malloy, Republics out of Step with U.S. Voters on Key
Issues, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, QUINNIPIAC U. POLL (Feb. 23,
2017), http://bit.ly/2lLJGlh.  Only three percent believe that no immigrants should
be deported. Id.
7. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
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delaying  or  halting  deportation  under  the  new  policy.8 This  Com- 
ment  will  also  argue  that  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security
(DHS)  should  exercise  its  newfound  ability  to  deport  Cubans  in  a 
humanitarian manner by keeping families together and prioritizing 
the deportation of criminals that pose a clear danger to the United 
States  over  other  Cubans  convicted  of  minor  offenses.9
   Part II of the Comment will explore the often tumultuous his- 
tory of foreign relations between the United States and Cuba, par- 
ticularly with respect to immigration policies, and discuss the mass 
migration of Cuban immigrants to the United States that occurred 
in the last half-century.10 Part III will begin by exploring the DHS’s 
ability to exercise discretion based upon a weighing of positive and 
negative factors on a case-by-case basis.11 Part III will then analyze 
the likelihood of a Cuban succeeding with a motion to reopen12 his 
or her case under various circumstances, including ineffective assis- 
tance of counsel.13 Finally, Part III will analyze the ability of a Cu- 
ban with a final order of removal to file a successful application for 
fear-based  relief  to  serve  as  a  defense  to  removal.14
II. BACKGROUND
supra note 15.
Harming Human Rights in the Name 
of  Promoting  Them:  The  Case  of  the  Cuban  Embargo, 12  UCLA  J. INT’L L.  & 
FOR. AFF. 199, 202–03 (2007).
17. Cave & Goldman, 
see also Albert R. Coli, 
See Act to Amend the Sugar Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 86-592 § 3, 74 
Stat. 330, 331 (1960); 
The Last Thaw: U.S.-Cuban Relations 
in Pictures, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), http://nyti.ms/25y8Jh6.
16. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195 § 620, 75 Stat. 424, 445
(1961).  The economic embargo originated with the United States’ desire to restrict 
sugar trade. 
See infra Part III.C.
  15. Damien Cave & Russell Goldman, 
See infra Part III.B.
14. Fear-based  relief  includes  asylum,  Withholding  of  Removal,  and  protec-
tion under the Convention Against Torture. 
see infra Part III.B.
13. 
 
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2012); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
   
         
        
 
         
         
  
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.
11. 
See infra Parts III.A–B.
10. 
See infra Part III.
9. 
  In January 1959, Fidel Castro and his rebel army overthrew the 
regime of American-friendly Fulgencio Batista and declared Cuba 
to bea communist nation.15 Relations between the UnitedStates 
and Cuba quickly deteriorated, and the United States imposed an 
economic embargo against the neighboring island nation.16 The 
embargo endured through the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Cold War.17
Fidel Castro’s commu-
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nist regime survived the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and
tenuously persists today, after Fidel’s death,18 led by his brother,
Raul.19  Raul Castro maintains a one-party political system, but has
implemented limited economic reforms and reduced the restrictions
on international travel for Cubans.20
B. Mass Migration from Cuba to the United States
The first mass exodus of Cubans to the United States, largely
to South Florida, occurred between 1950 and 1960.21  During that
decade, the population of Cuban-born individuals in the United
States more than doubled in anticipation of and in response to
Batista’s fall from power.22  In 1965, the United States and Cuba
brokered an agreement that allowed Cubans to take chartered
“freedom flights” from Havana to Miami.23  Approximately 300,000
Cubans arrived via freedom flights in the following decade.24  In
1980, more than 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States by
boat during the Mariel Boatlift,25 and boat migration increased
again in the mid-1990s with thousands of Cuban arrivals.26
C. Reasons for Mass Migration
The reasons that Cubans fled their country varied by the indi-
vidual.27  Many left to join family, to improve their economic situa-
tions, or to flee persecution from the communist regime.28
18. Fidel Castro passed away on November 26, 2016.   Anthony DePalma,
Fidel Castro, Cuban Revolutionary Who Defied U.S., Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
26, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2mO1BcW.
19. Raul Castro became president on December 2, 2008 due to Fidel’s poor
health, but Fidel still maintained a voice in government. See James C. McKinley
Jr., Raul Castro Becomes Cuban President, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2008), http://
nyti.ms/2ggYeqY.
20. Mimi Whitefield & Alfonso Chardy, Raul Castro Follows his Own Path,
MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 26, 2016), http://hrld.us/2jIv3C9.
21. Sylvia Rusin et al., Cuban Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-immi
grants-united-states.
22. Id.
23. Juan O. Tamayo, Chronology of the Cuban Revolution, MIAMI HERALD
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://hrld.us/2g4Mto5.
24. Rusin et al., supra note 21.
25. See infra Part II.F.1.
26. See infra Part II.F.1.
27. Silvia Pedraza, Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus, 5 J. INT’L INST., n. 2
(1998), http://bit.ly/2jhJoCv.
28. Id.
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1. Batista Sympathizers
Initially, after Castro took power in 1959, his government per-
secuted any person aligned with the overthrown president, Batista,
especially high-ranking government officials.29  Castro ordered
widespread trials that were widely recognized as flouting due pro-
cess and which often resulted in firing squad executions.30
2. Persecution of “Undesirable” Groups
The government-run hospitals in Cuba subjected mental health
patients to inhumane conditions.31  Although Cuba’s healthcare
system is now one of the most highly regarded in Latin America,32
it utilized electroshock therapy, failed to make proper diagnoses,
and neglected mentally ill patients.33
Another major reason why Cubans migrated to the United
States was because the Cuban government utilized forced labor
camps.34  From November 1965 to July 1968, the Cuban govern-
ment operated Military United to Aid Production, a program where
the Cuban government forced homosexual men, political dissidents,
and members of certain religious sects to perform farm labor.35
The program housed an undocumented number of people who
were subjected to little food, brutal work days, poor sanitary condi-
tions, and sometimes torture.36
29. Cuba to Resume Summary Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1959), http://
nyti.ms/2gC8Cxu; see also R. Hart Phillips, Castro Declares Trials Will Go On,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1959), http://nyti.ms/2g4W9ig.
30. See supra note 29.
31. Don A. Schanche, Cuban Rights Crackdown, Psychiatric Abuses Told,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 1989), http://lat.ms/2fpFMvn.
32. Gail Reed, Cuba’s Primary Health Care Revolution:  30 Years On, 86
BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 321, 327 (2008), http://www.who.int/bulletin/
volumes/86/5/08-030508.pdf?ua=1.
33. See generally Jerez v. Cuba, 775 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  In Jerez, the
appellant sued the Cuban government for punitive and compensatory damages af-
ter being subjected to electroshock therapy in a Cuban psychiatric hospital. Id. at
421.  The D.C. Circuit Court upheld the lower court’s grant of the motion to dis-
miss because of a lack of jurisdiction; however, the court found the allegations of
torture to be consistent with previous accounts. Id.  The court compared appel-
lant’s suffering to that of dissident Cuban writer Armando Valladares, who was
persecuted by the Castro regime. Id.
34. See Justin Halatyn, From Persecution to Acceptance? The History of
LGBT Rights in Cuba, COUNCIL FOR HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Oct. 24, 2012), http://
www.coha.org/from-persecution-to-acceptance-history-of-lgbt-in-cuba; see also
Michael Z. Wise, In Totalitarian Cuba, Ice Cream and Understanding, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 1995), http://nyti.ms/2fpOFF0.
35. See supra note 34.
36. See supra note 34.
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3. Property Seizure
The communist Cuban government seized many homes and
virtually all private businesses and industries.37  When a Cuban fled
to the United States or elsewhere, all of his property was redis-
tributed as the government saw fit.38  Therefore, many Cuban-born
United States citizens seek to reclaim property or businesses as nor-
malization occurs.39  Although the United States Department of
State considers handling such Cubans’ property claims as a priority
in diplomatic negotiations, there have been no clear victories for
those seeking property thus far.40  Although Congress enacted the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,41 which pro-
hibits foreign companies from profiting from the confiscated prop-
erty of U.S. citizens, including those born in Cuba,42 it has rarely
been enforced.43
4. Poverty and the Special Period
In the 1990s, many Cubans fled to the United States because of
the so-called “Special Period,” approximately four years of severe
economic hardship due to the collapse of Cuba’s principal trading
partner, the Soviet Union.44  The Special Period featured wide-
spread famine and lack of imported resources, particularly petro-
leum.45  Today, although Cuba has superior healthcare compared
with other developing countries, a large number of its citizens live
in poverty.46
37. Frances Robles, In Talks Over Seized U.S. Property, Havana Counters
With Own Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2015), http://nyti.ms/2fpXoHA.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021–6091 (1996).
42. Id.
43. The Helms-Burton Act received enormous international criticism, in part
because of its extraterritorial reach, especially among the European Union. See
George Chifor, Caveat Emptor:  Developing International Disciplines for Deterring
Third Party Investment in Unlawfully Expropriated Property, 33 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 179, 207–36 (2002).  Therefore, the United States has avoided actually
litigating such conflicts. Id.
44. See Richard Shiffman, How Cuban’s Health Improved When the Economy
Collapsed, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2013/04/how-cubans-health-improved-when-their-economy-collapsed/2750
80 (discussing widespread famine and lack of imported resources during the Spe-
cial Period).
45. Id.
46. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Can Cuba Escape Poverty but Stay Healthy?,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://nyti.ms/2kijAKk.
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Furthermore, past United States policy, like the Cuban Medi-
cal Professional Parole Program (CMPP), contributed to the drain
of highly educated workers from Cuba.47  The United States gov-
ernment created the CMPP in 2006 to allow certain Cuban medical
professionals to apply for parole48 at the United States embassy in a
third country.49  Although Cuba’s doctors are among the best
trained in Latin America, they earn only the equivalent of approxi-
mately 70 U.S. dollars per month.50  The Cuban government rents
the doctors’ services to foreign countries, especially those in Latin
America, in exchange for money, oil, and diplomatic clout.51  Cu-
ban doctors often take advantage of the CMPP to defect from Cuba
while serving in their foreign posts.52
Recently, increased American tourism has helped Cubans for-
tunate enough to obtain jobs in the tourism industry.53  However,
the tourism industry does not require skilled workers, like doctors,
and the tourists’ food consumption has crippled the country’s al-
ready sparse food supply.54
D. Human Rights in Cuba Today
Today, under the leadership of Raul Castro, the Cuban govern-
ment continues to commit human rights abuses, albeit fewer than
during the Cold War.55  Prison guards physically assault politically
dissident inmates, and prison conditions are poor.56  Police harass,
and sometimes physically assault, peaceful protestors, particularly
the well-established Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White) and the
Patriotic Union of Cuba.57  Freedom of speech is heavily restricted,
47. See Statement by the President on Cuban Immigration Policy, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 11 (Jan. 12, 2017).
48. “A parolee is an alien, appearing to be inadmissible to the inspecting of-
ficer, allowed into the United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or when that
alien’s entry is determined to be for significant public benefit.”  Definition of
Terms, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://bit.ly/2lElcvN.
49. Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERV. (Jan. 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/2lSbGbd.
50. See Victoria Burnett & Frances Robles, U.S. and Cuba at Odds Over Exo-
dus of the Island’s Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://nyti.ms/2mRTImU.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Azam Ahmed, Cuba’s Surge in Tourism Keeps Food Off Residents’
Plates, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jePTZ8.
54. Id.
55. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H. R. AND LAB.,
CUBA 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1–2 (2015)[hereinafter Cuba 2015 Human
Rights Report].
56. Id.
57. Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 2.  The Ladies in White
are a group of political dissidents in Cuba formed by the wives and family mem-
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especially when the speech is critical of the government.58  The Cu-
ban government allows the free practice of many religions, espe-
cially Catholicism, but at times monitors, harasses, and confiscates
property from members of other Christian denominations.59  The
Cuban government officially decriminalized homosexual activity in
197960 and encourages the inclusion of citizens with all sexual orien-
tations;61 however, the government does not recognize gay mar-
riages.62  Furthermore, Cuban society does not generally support
gay rights.63  In 2015, civilians stoned a transsexual Cuban to death
and the suspects were investigated and arrested by the police.64
Additionally, in Cuba, a homophobic stigma pervades against HIV/
AIDS-positive people.65  The Cuban government provides very lim-
ited medication for HIV/AIDS and criminalizes having the disease
as “propagating an epidemic.”66
bers of incarcerated political prisoners who regularly protest against the Castro
government and its repression of speech both in Cuba and abroad in exile. See
Alan Gomez, Cuba Arrests Dozens of Human Rights Protesters Before Obama’s
Arrival, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2016), http://usat.ly/1PkTZ6W; see also Nora
Gamez Torres, Exiled Ladies in White Members Demand Leader’s Resignation Af-
ter YouTube Video, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 18, 2015), http://hrld.us/2jIyKHM.  The
Patriotic Union of Cuba is a dissident political party, unrecognized as such by the
government, which promotes free press and information, economic, social welfare
policy, and electoral reforms. See Nona Gamez Torres, Jose´ Daniel Ferrer, The
Man Behind Cuba’s Largest Opposition Group, MIAMI HERALD (May 27, 2016),
http://hrld.us/1OSqhaS.
58. Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 12.
59. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., CUBA
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 1–8 (2015).
60. From Persecution to Acceptance? The History of LGBT Rights in Cuba,
COUNCIL FOR HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Oct. 24, 2012), http://bit.ly/2mwB2I9.
61. Fidel Castro’s daughter, Mariela Castro, is very outspoken in promoting
gay rights and heads Cuba’s Sexual Health Institute; however, legal unions for
same-sex couples are not yet recognized under Cuban law. See Cuba Gay Pride
Calls for Same-Sex Marriage to Become Legal, BBC NEWS (May 10, 2015), http://
bbc.in/1Irg0Dj.
62. Cuba Reciprocity Schedule: Marriage, Divorce Certificates, DEP’T OF
STATE, http://bit.ly/2lTdocb (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
63. Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 25.
64. Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 25; Courtney
O’Donnell, Transgender Day of Remembrance 2015, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3,
2016), http://huff.to/2j4Bw9G.
65. Rebecca Sananes, Love, Loss, and Beauty Pageants: Inside a Cuban HIV
Sanitarium, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 26, 2016), http://n.pr/1odr5zA.  During the
1990’s, the Cuban government forcibly housed HIV-positive patients in “sanitar-
iums” in an effort to control the spread of HIV/AIDs. Id.  At least one sanitarium
still exists. Id.
66. Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 26.
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E. Evolving Immigration Benefits for Cuban Citizens Post-
Normalization of Relations
On December 17, 2014, then-President Obama announced his
intent to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba.67
In 2015, Cuban migration to the United States increased 78 percent
following the former president’s announcement.68  On June 16,
2017, President Trump announced that he was “canceling the last
administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba.”69  How-
ever, the announcement did not completely reverse the Obama-era
policies toward Cuba; the countries maintain diplomatic relations
and travel is still permitted, although with more limits.70
1. End of the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy
As one of the final moves of his presidency, Barack Obama
reached an agreement to end the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy with
Cuba.71  The Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy sprung from an agreement
between the United States and Cuba in 1995 to streamline the
countries’ migration policies in a humanitarian way.72  The essence
of the policy was that Cubans intercepted at sea by the United
States government were sent back to Cuba, while Cubans who
reached dry land were permitted to remain legally in the United
States.73  The Coast Guard was largely responsible for implement-
ing the policy, as outlined by the DHS.74  President Trump declined
67. Peter Baker, U.S. to Restore Full Relations with Cuba, Erasing a Last
Trace of Cold War Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://nyti.ms/2jIVUxM.
68. Jens Manual Krogstad, Surge in Cuban Immigration to U.S. Continues into
2016, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/
08/05/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-relations-warm/.
69. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Reverses Pieces of Obama-Era Engagement
with Cuba, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2sIaL0t.
70. The most substantive changes in United States policy toward Cuba as a
result of this announcement were increasing restrictions on commercial travelers
and prohibiting business transactions between American entities and individuals
and companies owned by the Cuban military. Id.
71. Joint Statement, supra note 2.
72. Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration, Building on the Agree-
ment of September 9, 1994, May 2, 1995, Cuba–U.S., 35 I.L.M. 327, (discussing the
“common interest in preventing unsafe departures from Cuba which risk loss to
human life”).
73. Id. at 328; see also, Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Johnson, Case No. 16-
cv-21868-CV-GAYLES, 2019 WL 4704940, at *7, *22 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2016)
(holding that where Cuban migrants landed on a lighthouse seven miles off the
coast of Florida, the U.S. Coast Guard did not act unreasonably in determining
that it should process the migrants as if they were encountered at sea rather than
dry land).
74. Coast Guard’s Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, COMDTINST
M16247.1F, ECF No. 12-1 at 29–32.
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to reinstate the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy in his June 16, 2017 pol-
icy shift.75
2. Easing of Travel Restrictions
Prior to the repeal of the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy, the num-
ber of Cuban immigrants to the United States had been increas-
ing.76   One cause for the increased migration was that the Cuban
government eased its harsh travel restrictions in 2012 with Ley 302
(Law 302), legislation that allows its citizens to leave the country
without risking their citizenship and permits permanent defectors to
return to the island for 90-day periods without persecution.77
3. The Cuban Adjustment Act
The Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) of 196678 treats Cubans as
a privileged class of immigrants with expedited pathways to perma-
nent residency and to citizenship.79  The CAA requires physical
presence in the United States for one year before a Cuban is eligi-
ble to apply for Legal Permanent Resident (LPR)80 status and re-
ceive a “green card.”81
The CAA would take an act of Congress to repeal; thus, it re-
mains in effect despite the end of the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy.82
However, as a practical matter, the end of the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot
Policy greatly weakens the CAA’s special treatment to potential
Cuban immigrants.83  As a result of the repeal of the policy, Cubans
75. Update on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 16,
2017), http://bit.ly/2uhsvkA.
76. Krogstad, supra note 68.
77. Ley 302, Gaceta Oficial 16-10-2012 (Cub.) (translated by author).
78. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 8972, 80 Stat. 1161 (as
amended) (reproduced as historical note to 8 U.S.C. § 1255) (2012)).
79. Id.
80. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines an LPR as, “the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not
having changed.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012).
81. A “green card” is the documentary proof of one’s LPR status. See Green
Card for a Cuban Native or Citizen, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., http://
bit.ly/2fGNbHJ (last visited Nov. 23, 2016).
82. See Nora Gamez Torres, U.S. Updates Some Answers to Lingering Ques-
tions on New Immigration Policy For Cubans, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://hrld.us/2lStHGn.
83. See Hannah Berkeley Cohen, Azam Ahmed, & Frances Robles, Cubans
Planning to Leave for U.S. Face a Bleak New Reality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://nyti.ms/2jGstJC (discussing the adverse effect repealing Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot
had on Cuban immigrants in transit from Cuba to the United States via the Mexi-
can border). See also Sarah Marsh & Nelson Acosta, Cuba Says United States has
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are no longer automatically paroled84 into the United States as they
had been previously.85  Rather, they are treated as any other immi-
grant arriving at a border and undergo expedited removal86 if they
do not have documentation to enter.87  However, if a Cuban is ad-
mitted or paroled in the United States on any visa, he may still en-
joy the benefits of the CAA by adjusting his status to that of an
LPR after one year of presence.88  Cuban citizens may still apply
for a visa to travel or move to the United States, and the United
States has committed to providing 20,000 visas per year to
Cubans.89  Importantly, like any other would-be immigrant, a Cu-
ban may still apply for asylum and any other relief based upon a
claim of fear.90
F. Cubans with Final Orders of Removal
Cuban immigrants previously enjoyed de facto immunity from
removal to Cuba.91  There are at least 34,000 Cubans with final or-
ders of removal in the United States, due in large part to criminal
convictions.92  The United States had been unable to enforce the
orders of removal until its 2017 agreement with Cuba.93  President
Trump’s administration continues to deport both Cubans who at-
tempt to cross the border into the United States without proper
documentation and Cubans with final orders of removal.94  Before
the 2017 agreement, the Cuban government refused to issue travel
documents for would-be deportees, in large part because of the
breakdown in diplomatic relations.95  At the same time, the United
Deported 117 Cuban Migrants Since Policy Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2017), http:/
/nyti.ms/2lEeIgx.
84. Definition of Terms, supra note 48.
85. Gamez Torres, supra note 82.
86. Expedited removal is a streamlined process of deportation without a for-
mal hearing used when border officials determine that an immigrant is inadmissi-
ble and does not have a credible claim of fear of returning to his home country.  8
U.S.C. § 1225 (2012).
87. Gamez Torres, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. Joint Statement, supra note 2.
90. Gamez Torres, supra note 82; see also infra Part III.C.
91. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
92. Id.
93. Joint Statement, supra note 2; see, e.g., Kate Morrissey, Chula Vista Man
is Getting Deported to Cuba now that Channels are Open, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE (June 16 2017), http://bit.ly/2vvChj1.
94. Morrissey, supra note 93.
95. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.  Cuba is not the only country that has
refused to take back some or all criminal deportees; the United States government
considers 23 countries to be “uncooperative” in taking back deportees, including
Haiti, Guyana, China, India, and Sierra Leone. See Ron Nixon, Nations Hinder
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States is not permitted to incarcerate criminal deportees for an un-
reasonable time after they have finished serving their criminal
sentences, so many would-be criminal deportees are not detained.96
1. The Mariel Boatlift
One major historical exception to the United States’ previous
inability to deport criminal Cubans was the Mariel Boatlift.  Be-
tween April 15 and October 31, 1980, the Castro regime permitted
any of its citizens who wished to leave Cuba to do so from the
Mariel Port, after over 10,000 Cubans requested asylum by occupy-
ing South American embassies in Havana.97  The United States
soon discovered that among the 125,000 refugees98 were thousands
of criminal prisoners and mental health patients from institutions
that the Cuban government released to be transported to Florida
from the port.99  Accordingly, in 1984, the United States and Cuba
brokered an agreement that Cuba would take back 2,746 of the
prisoners and mental health patients.100  Of those, approximately
2,200 so-called “Mariel Cubans” have been deported back to Cuba
to date.101  As part of Obama’s January 12, 2017 agreement with
Cuba ending the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy, Cuba agreed to take
back up to 500 more Mariel Cubans.102
2. Department of Homeland Security Processes
In addition to the more than 34,000103 Cubans with outstanding
deportation orders, the DHS has the ability to initiate proceedings
against Cubans who committed crimes decades ago and have not
U.S. Effort to Deport Immigrants Convicted of Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016),
http://nyti.ms/2iLZNmc.
96. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (holding that after one has
served his criminal sentence, with limited exception, one may not be held for an
unreasonable period past the 90-day limit if the U.S. government fails to execute
his removal order).
97. See Andrew Glass, Castro Launches Mariel Boatlift, POLITICO (Apr. 20,
2009), http://politi.co/2g6fzDo; see also Maria Sacchetti, Cuba Deal Brings Depor-
tation Questions, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 26, 2014), http://bit.ly/2gjeues.
98. Alfonso Chardy, How Fidel Castro and the Mariel Boatlift Changed Lives
and Changed Miami, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 26, 2016), http://hrld.us/2kX5yi9.
99. Glass, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Joint Statement, supra note 2. See also Francis Robles, ‘Marielitos’ Face
Long-Delayed Reckoning:  Expulsion to Cuba, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017), http://
nyti.ms/2mfMPif.
103. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
720 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:707
yet undergone immigration proceedings.104  Thus, the number of
Cubans that the DHS seeks to deport may extend beyond those
that have already gone through immigration proceedings.105
When the DHS seeks to deport an immigrant, it initiates either
an expedited removal process106 or a removal proceeding before an
Immigration Judge (IJ) to determine the immigrant’s
deportability.107
However, because the DHS may exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion,108 and there is a backlog of over 533,000 cases in the immigra-
tion courts,109 it seems unlikely that the DHS would prioritize
Cuban individuals who it has not previously initiated proceedings
against.110  The DHS has likely already prosecuted the most dan-
gerous criminals, considering its stated priority to do so under the
previous administration.111
III. ANALYSIS
The remainder of this Comment will explore possible avenues
of relief for Cubans with final orders of removal now that Cuba has
agreed to issue travel documents to deportees.112  Few Americans
likely oppose deporting dangerous criminals who have committed
serious crimes.113  For that reason, this Comment will focus on the
104. Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that there is no
statute of limitations for immigration proceedings); see also Matter of S, 9 I. & N.
Dec. 548, 553 (B.I.A. 1962).
105. See Biggs, 55 F.3d at 1401.
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012); see supra note 86.
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1129a.  An IJ is “an attorney whom the Attorney General
appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office of Immigration
Review, qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing
under section 240.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(4).
108. Alan D. Bersin et al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Re-
moval of Undocumented Immigrants, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [hereinafter 2014 DHS Memo] (dis-
cussing the allocation of resources for different categories of immigrants under the
Obama administration).
109. Immigration Court Backlog Continues to Grow, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
(Jan. 18, 2017), http://bit.ly/2iM4wEo.
110. On the other hand, DHS under the Trump administration has drastically
reduced its use of prosecutorial discretion. See Implementing the President’s Bor-
der Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvement Policies, DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC. (Feb. 20, 2017), http://bit.ly/2lrcCRg; Kevin McAleenan et al.,
Enforcement of Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest, DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC. (Feb. 20, 2017), http://bit.ly/2miirQd.
111. 2014 DHS Memo, supra note 108.
112. Patricia Zengerle, Obama Administration Ends Special Immigration Pol-
icy for Cubans, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017), http://reut.rs/2jJWdt9.
113. Malloy, supra note 6.
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more sympathetic class of Cubans with final orders of removal, in-
cluding those who were convicted of non-violent crimes years or
decades ago and have not reoffended, those who have become pro-
ductive members of society, and those who would suffer persecu-
tion if they were removed to Cuba.  This Comment will also
recommend that the DHS conduct the removal process in the most
humanitarian manner possible, including exercising discretion in
how it prioritizes removals114 and filing joint motions to reopen115
for sympathetic Cubans with removal orders.116
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
The least labor-intensive avenue of relief for a Cuban with a
final order of removal is prosecutorial discretion because if granted
favorably, prosecutorial discretion does not involve litigation.117
While the DHS has the power to exercise prosecutorial discretion
in normal immigration proceedings, whether the DHS will apply
discretion to the enforcement of existing removal orders remains to
be seen.118
1. Costs of Mass Deportation
The DHS should apply discretion to not enforce some existing
removal orders for sympathetic Cubans, in part because it would
cost the government a great deal119 to deport all 34,000 with
Cubans with final orders.  The government must pay an enormous
cost to remove immigrants, including compensating Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE)120 agents to locate and apprehend
individuals and purchasing transportation back to an individual’s
country of origin.121  On average, the government must spend an
estimated $10,070 to deport a single person when arrest, detention,
114. See infra Part III.A.
115. See infra Part III.B.
116. See infra Part III.B.
117. See Practice Pointer:  Escalating Requests for Prosecutorial Discretion
Before ICE ERO and ICE-OCC, AM. IMMIGR. LAW ASS’N, http://www.aila.org/
infonet/ice-escalating-requests-prosecutorial-discretion (last updated Dec. 30,
2015) (describing the process of contacting the DHS to request or argue for
prosecutorial discretion).
118. 2014 DHS Memo, supra note 108, at 10.
119. See Phillip E. Wogin, What Would It Cost to Deport All 5 Million Benefi-
ciaries of Executive Action on Immigration, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 23,
2015), http://ampr.gs/1zazMJm.
120. ICE is the department of the DHS in charge of enforcing immigration
statutes and preventing terrorism and cross-border crime. See What We Do, IM-
MIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/overview (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
121. The Costs of Mass Deportation, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2016), http://
on.wsj.com/21AbxD7 (estimating that the United States is able to deport only
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legal costs, and transportation are considered.122  At this point, no
regular commercial boat travel to Cuba exists other than cruises, so
the United States government must either charter flights or buy
seats from airlines for deportees.123
The DHS should also apply discretion in choosing which final
orders of removal to enforce because deportation adversely affects
families, both emotionally and financially.124  Children who have a
parent at risk of deportation, or in deportation proceedings, show
increased psychological trauma and behavior issues.125  Addition-
ally, by removing someone who might be the breadwinner of his or
her family, or the caretaker of children, that family would suffer
financially and likely need to seek government assistance.126  Thus,
the DHS should consider both the economic and social costs of de-
portation when exercising discretion.
2. Previously Identified Discretionary Priorities
Under the Trump administration, the DHS has drastically de-
creased its use of prosecutorial discretion when determining against
whom to initiate removal proceedings.127  Former DHS Secretary
John Kelly issued two memoranda on February 20, 2017, making
clear that while the Trump administration seeks to remove danger-
ous criminals, the DHS would also initiate proceedings against any
person with a final order of removal or without a valid visa.128
However, due to the extreme backlog in the immigration courts and
the above-discussed economic and human costs of deportation, the
Trump administration should strongly consider taking into account
discretionary factors, like those utilized by the Obama administra-
tion, to ensure that resources are efficiently spent in a manner con-
400,000 immigrants per year given its current budget and outlining the enormous
costs associated with mass deportations).
122. Wogin, supra note 119.
123. Douglas Hanks, Port Miami Preparing for Daily Service to Cuba, MIAMI
HERALD (Feb. 1, 2016), http://hrld.us/1RWBpJf (noting that commercial ferries
from Miami to Havana are still in development and in the process of being ap-
proved, although cruise ships have started to make the trips).
124. Randy Capps et al., Implications of Immigration Enforcement Activities
for the Well-Being of Children in Immigrant Families, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.
(Sept. 2015), http://bit.ly/1ivbrNi.
125. Id.
126. While there are no studies determining the effect of a deported parent
on the family’s income, the incarceration of an immigrant parent can decrease a
family’s income by as much as 70 percent within six months. Id.
127. Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforce-
ment Improvement Policies, supra note 110; McAleenan, supra note 110.
128. See supra note 127.
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sistent with public safety.129  Furthermore, the Trump
administration’s recent statements strongly condemning the Castro
regime’s human rights violations are inconsistent with indiscrimi-
nate deportations of Cubans, because deportation puts Cubans at
risk of suffering at the hands of the Cuban government.130
The DHS should take into account discretionary factors when
determining if it should execute a Cuban’s final order of removal,
similar to those used under the Obama administration.  The Obama
administration issued a memo (the “2014 DHS Memo”) which pri-
oritized certain classes of individuals for removal proceedings in
2014 after many Cubans with outstanding deportation orders were
convicted of their original crimes.131  The individuals prioritized in-
cluded individuals involved in criminal street gangs, aggravated
felons,132 terrorists, and individuals apprehended while entering the
United States illegally.133  However, because Cubans received spe-
cial status under the Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy, the likelihood is
small that a Cuban would have entered the United States unlaw-
fully.134  The DHS should prioritize an individual’s removal if the
underlying criminal offense falls under one of the previously out-
lined priorities over an individual whose criminal offense does not
fit into one of the categories.135
The 2014 DHS Memo suggests that the DHS has the power to
elect to use similar discretion in deporting individuals with final re-
moval orders.136  The 2014 DHS Memo states that immigrants is-
sued a final order of removal after January 1, 2014, are to be
regarded as “Priority 3 aliens” with “the third and lowest priority
for apprehension and removal.”137  The 2014 DHS Memo stipulates
129. Scott Martelle, Trump’s Immigration Enforcement has just Made a Bad
Situation Worse, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2017), http://lat.ms/2tZeXFr (arguing that by
failing to prioritize dangerous criminals through the exercise of discretion, the
Trump administration makes the United States less safe, because the criminals are
more likely to remain at large).
130. When President Trump announced the shift in policy toward Cuba, he
strongly denounced the Castro regime, stating, “To the Cuban government I say:
Put an end to the abuse of dissidents.  Release the political prisoners.  Stop jailing
innocent people. . . .  We will never, ever be blind to it.  We remember what hap-
pened.”  Davis, supra note 69.
131. 2014 DHS Memo, supra note 108.
132. The INA enumerates specific convictions that it considers to be aggra-
vated felonies.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(43) (2012).
133. 2014 DHS Memo, supra note 108.
134. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 8972, 80 Stat. 1161 (as
amended) (reproduced as historical note to 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)).
135. 2014 DHS Memo, supra note 108.
136. See id.
137. Id.
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that “resources should be dedicated accordingly” and that Priority 3
aliens:
should generally be removed unless they qualify for asylum or
another form of relief under our laws or, unless, in the judgment
of an immigration officer, the alien is not a threat to the integrity
of the immigration system or there are factors suggesting the
alien should not be an enforcement priority.138
Despite the DHS’s new ability to deport more than 34,000 Cu-
ban immigrants upon normalization of relations between the
United States and Cuba,139 the DHS should apply the Obama-era
enforcement priorities to those immigrants.  If the DHS chooses to
apply these priorities to Cubans with final orders of removal, the
Obama-era, 2014 DHS Memo suggests that a potential deportee
may be spared deportation if an immigration officer decides there
are enough mitigating circumstances.140  The 2014 DHS Memo
states the following:
ICE will review the cases of individuals scheduled for removal.
However, if you have been scheduled for removal and believe
that you merit prosecutorial discretion, including if you believe
you qualify for DACA or deferred action, you should promptly
contact the ERO officer responsible for your case to discuss the
matter.141
The DHS Memo does not describe mitigating circumstances,
but they can be inferred from other areas of discretionary immigra-
tion laws.142  For example, when an IJ weighs a respondent’s equi-
ties when deciding whether to grant an INA section 212 waiver143
for certain crimes, the IJ considers the following to be favorable
factors:
[F]amily ties within the United States, residence of long duration
in this country, evidence of hardship to the respondent and his
family if deportation occurs, service in this country’s Armed
Forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or
138. Id.
139. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
140. Id.
141. ICE Instructions for Seeking Prosecutorial Discretion Under 2014 Execu-
tive Action, AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N. (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-
instructions-seeking-prosecutorial-discretion/.
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (providing a discretionary waiver of inadmissi-
bility for immigrants with certain low level convictions).
143. The waiver is a one-time option for LPR immigrants who committed
some minor crimes to avoid deportation if they can establish that they warrant a
positive discretionary determination.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
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business ties, evidence of value and service to the community,
proof of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and
other evidence attesting to the alien’s good character.144
As a population, Cubans with removal orders from decades
ago may have particularly strong factual arguments for long resi-
dence duration in the United States and family ties because Cubans
have migrated in large numbers to the United States for more than
five decades.145  The longer a Cuban has lived in the United States,
the more likely he or she has become a valuable member of the
community and has a stable work history.146  In the same 212(h)
waiver of inadmissibility proceedings, the IJ weighs the above posi-
tive factors against the negative factors, which include the nature
and underlying facts of the ground for exclusion, violations to
United States immigration laws, the criminal record, and any other
evidence indicative of an alien’s bad character or undesirability as a
permanent resident of the United States.147  Thus, a Cuban who
committed a minor crime decades ago, which did not qualify as a
prosecutorial priority, would not meet many of the negative
factors.148
Prosecutorial discretion is a useful tool because advocates may
petition the DHS for favorable discretion, expending minimal time
and resources without incurring large costs.149  However, even if the
DHS decides not to immediately enforce the order of removal,
there is no concrete, legal guarantee that it will refrain from doing
so in the future.150  Furthermore, under the Trump administration,
the DHS has greatly decreased its use of discretion in initiating re-
moval proceedings.151  Nevertheless, Cubans should consider ask-
ing the DHS for prosecutorial discretion if they meet most or all of
the abovementioned positive factors.
144. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978). See also
Tenorio v. Holder, 603 Fed. Appx. 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2015); Najib v. I.N.S., No. 93-
3139, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6407, at *5 (6th Cir. 1994) (implementing the factor-
based test from Matter of Marin).
145. Krogstad, supra note 68; see supra Part II.B.
146. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
147. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. at 584.
148. Id.
149. See Practice Pointer, supra note 117.
150. See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that the
Administrative Procedure Act did not require judicial review for prosecutorial dis-
cretion by the Food and Drug Administration).
151. Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforce-
ment Improvement Policies, supra note 110; McAleenan, supra note 110.
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3. Gubernatorial Pardons
Due to the current administration’s aversion to using
prosecutorial discretion,152 Cubans with final orders of removal,
who have extraordinarily compelling personal circumstances,
should consider applying for a gubernatorial pardon for the convic-
tion underlying the final order of removal.153  Although this
method will likely only be successful for those living in states with
immigrant-friendly governors and who have truly exceptional merit,
governors have recently granted similar pardons to help immigrants
avoid deportation.154
B. Motions to Reopen
The remaining possible avenues for relief require a motion to
reopen the removal proceeding.155  Motions to reopen must gener-
ally be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal.156  How-
ever, there are two notable exceptions to the filing deadline that
Cubans with final orders of removal should explore:  agreement
with the DHS to reopen157 and changed country conditions.158
The first exception requires the immigrant with a final order of
removal to file a joint motion to the immigration court with DHS
counsel.159  The DHS is permitted to file a joint motion in cases that
do not involve adjustment of status “only under exceptional and
compelling circumstances.”160  An IJ may consider the following
factors to determine whether the circumstances meet that
requirement:
(1) whether the alien has presented new evidence that is material
and was not available and could not reasonably have been dis-
covered or presented at the former hearing; (2) whether the alien
is eligible for the relief sought; (3) whether the alien merits a
favorable exercise of discretion; (4) the hardship to the alien and/
152. See supra note 151.
153. See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, To Stave off a Deportation, Cuomo Pardons a
9/11 Volunteer, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2vEjgL1 (reporting that
New York Governor Cuomo pardoned the crimes of a Colombian immigrant with
a final order of removal in order to allow his case to be reopened and dismissed
because he served as a first responder on 9/11).
154. Id.
155. A successful motion to reopen allows an immigrant’s final adjudication
to be reheard.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2012).
156. 8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
157. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) (2014).
158. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i).
159. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iv).
160. INS General Counsel Updates Motion to Reopen Policy, Including NA-
CARA Motions, 75 No. 7 Interpreter Releases, 259.
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or his U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident family members
. . . ; (5) the alien’s criminal history, if any; (6) the number and
severity of the alien’s immigration violations; (7) whether the
alien has cooperated with . . . investigation . . .; and (8) whether
the alien’s removal is consistent with INS objectives.161
As previously discussed, Cuban immigrants with careers and
families may garner more sympathy, which may increase the likeli-
hood of a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.162  Simi-
larly, if the crime that prompted the immigrant’s final order of
removal was nonviolent and occurred decades ago without a re-of-
fense, the lack of a subsequent criminal history may be a positive
factor.163  A Cuban would be unlikely to have violated any immi-
gration policy because of the favorable status given to Cubans
under the former Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot Policy.164  The availability of
34,000165 people with finalized orders of removal to deport is un-
precedented and, therefore, the DHS should consider a Cuban im-
migrant with the abovementioned characteristics to constitute an
“exceptional” circumstance that warrants relief from final removal
orders.166
The second exception to the 90-day deadline, making a motion
to reopen, applies to applications for asylum,167 Withholding of Re-
moval,168 and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) and is discussed in more detail below.169
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Immigration
Proceedings
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)170 provides that
immigrants in removal proceedings have a right to counsel, but they
are not entitled to court-appointed representation during any stage
of the process.171  However, in some cases, immigrants may still
make a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel dur-
161. Id. at 259–60.
162. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (B.I.A. 1978).
163. Id.
164. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 8972, 80 Stat. 1161 (as
amended) (reproduced as historical note to 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)).
165. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3.
166. INS General Counsel Updates Motion to Reopen Policy, Including NA-
CARA Motions, supra note 160.
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2012).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006).
169. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2014).
170. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(E).
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ing the immigration proceeding.172  The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals173 (BIA) set forth three requirements to do so.174 First, the
applicant must accompany the motion to reopen with the retainer
agreement between the applicant and counsel and allegations of
what that counsel did and did not do.175  Second, the accused coun-
sel must receive notice of the claim and opportunity to respond.176
Finally, the IJ determines “whether a complaint has been filed with
appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding such representa-
tion.”177  Some circuits have modified or added to this test.  For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit utilizes a two-part test requiring analysis of
whether a competent attorney would have acted differently and
whether the outcome was affected by the incompetency.178  Cubans
with a final order of removal should review their previous immigra-
tion proceedings to determine if their counsel was adequate.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Proceedings that
Have Immigration Consequences Under Padilla v.
Kentucky
Immigrants may also make a motion to reopen based upon in-
effective assistance of counsel during their criminal proceedings
that subsequently gave rise to removal orders.179  The Supreme
Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky180 that defense counsel in a crimi-
nal matter must competently advise their clients regarding immigra-
tion consequences before the client enters a guilty plea.181  In
criminal cases, to prove a claim of ineffective assistance, one must
satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.182
172. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988) (setting forth
high standards in order for a respondent to succeed with a motion to reopen due to
ineffective assistance of counsel).
173. The BIA is the highest administrative appeals body for immigration law
and is usually subject to judicial review by federal appeals courts. Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 24 2016), http://bit.ly/2kOSLhe.
174. Matter of Lozada, 19 I.& N. at 639.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004).  But see Habib v.
Lynch, 787 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2015) (employing a three-part test including
compliance with proper procedure, prejudice, and “showing that the proceeding
was so fundamentally unfair that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his
case”) (quoting Solis-Chavez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2011)).
179. INS General Counsel Updates Motion to Reopen Policy, Including NA-
CARA Motions, supra note 160.
180. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
181. Id. at 367.
182. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See also State v. Del-
gado, No. A-3276-08T4, 2010 WL 4642989, at *11-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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The plaintiff must show that (1) the defense counsel was deficient
and (2) that the counsel caused actual prejudice.183
State courts have applied slightly different interpretations of
the requirements for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Padilla.184  For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals held
that counsel must give “correct advice” to a criminal defendant
where the applicable immigration statute is “succinct, clear, and ex-
plicit” in establishing deportation consequences.185  However,
where the statute is not “succinct, clear, and explicit . . . a criminal
defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigra-
tion consequences.”186
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim might be particularly
useful to a Cuban with a final order of removal because the CAA is
likely not within the average criminal defense attorney’s range of
expertise.187  However, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
would not apply to the more sympathetic group of Cubans with de-
cades-old orders of removal because Padilla does not apply retroac-
tively;188 therefore, one can raise a claim under its holding only if
the conviction became final after March 31, 2010, when the Su-
preme Court decided Padilla.189
If an attorney believed that Cubans could not be deported, but
did not have a full understanding of the CAA and immigration law,
the attorney may have misinterpreted the law to mean that Cubans
were permanently protected from deportation when, in fact, the
only “protection” was that the Cuban government previously did
Nov. 18, 2010) (applying the Strickland test to a Padilla analysis); George L. Blum,
Construction and Application by State Courts of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in
Padilla v. Kentucky, That Defense Counsel Has Obligation to Advise Defendant
that Entering Guilty Plea Could Result in Deportation, 74 A.L.R.6th 373, 4 (2016)
(explaining that the Strickland test is applied by state courts in a Padilla analysis).
183. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
184. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
185. People v. Kazadi, 284 P.3d 70, 73 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting Padilla, 559
U.S. at 369).
186. Id. This interpretation seems to align with Justice Alito’s concurrence in
Padilla, where he reasoned that defense lawyers do not necessarily have the spe-
cialized knowledge that immigration law requires; therefore, the criminal defense
lawyer should advise simply that, “the client should consult an immigration spe-
cialist if the client wants advice on the subject.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–88 (Alito,
J., concurring).
187. Padilla, 559 U.S. 356, 375–88 (Alito, J., concurring).
188. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (reasoning that
Padilla was a new rule and “when we announce a ‘new rule,’ a person whose con-
viction is already final may not benefit from the decision in habeas or similar
proceedings”).
189. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356.
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not issue travel documents for its citizens with final orders of re-
moval.190  Therefore, a criminal defense attorney conceivably may
have improperly advised a Cuban client that a particular conviction
would not have immigration consequences because of his or her
country of origin.  Cubans with final orders of removal should re-
view their criminal cases to determine if they have a viable claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla.191
C. Defensive Applications for Asylum, Withholding of Removal,
and Protection Under the Convention Against Torture
To challenge their final order of removal, in some circum-
stances Cubans may apply for protection in the form of asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and protection under the CAT.192  The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-589 en-
compasses each of these grounds for relief, and an IJ will consider
each claim during the same proceeding.193  As this Comment will
further discuss, applicants with final orders of removal must first
succeed in a motion to reopen194 their immigration cases and then
must satisfy the burdens of proof and elements for each form of
relief.
1. Motion to Reopen for Changed Country Conditions
When immigrants make a motion to reopen,195 they must show
that there is new evidence that is both material and was previously
unavailable.196  The immigrants also must make a prima facie case
that they are eligible for the type of relief sought.197  When the im-
migrants have a final order of removal, they may file a motion to
reopen only for changed country conditions in their home coun-
190. Alvarez & Hussey, supra note 3 (explaining that the Cuban government
generally refuses to issue travel documents to its citizens with final orders of
removal).
191. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356.
192. Form I-589 contains the application for asylum, Withholding of Removal,
and protection under the CAT. I-589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.uscis.gov/i-589 (last updated
June 28, 2017).
193. The application form I-589 has a box that the applicant checks if he or
she would like to be considered for protection under the CAT in addition to With-
holding of Removal and asylum. Id.
194. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2012).
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
197. Matter of S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 252 (B.I.A. 2007); see also Poradis-
ova v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005).
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tries, but not for changed personal conditions.198  The BIA has
broad discretion when dealing with motions to reopen and may dis-
cretionarily deny a motion “if the movant fails to sustain the heavy
burden of showing eligibility for relief or to proffer material, previ-
ously unavailable evidence, or if [it is] convinced that a favorable
exercise of discretion on the asylum application is unlikely.”199
A change in country conditions unique to each Cuban’s situa-
tion is the newfound practical ability to be deported following for-
mer President Obama’s announcement.200  Phrased more broadly, a
Cuban could argue that the country conditions have changed due to
the restoration of diplomatic ties between the United States and
Cuba.201  No published case law analyzes whether restoration of re-
lations between the United States and another country, or a new-
found ability to be deported, qualifies as changed country
conditions.  However, a court has held that a change in the United
States’ law is insufficient to prove a change in country conditions.202
A Cuban may try to distinguish his case because it was a change in
his own country’s policies to not issue travel documents for depor-
tees, rather than any policy or legislation of the United States.203
The argument that conditions in Cuba have worsened may
prove difficult to argue because although political repression and
poverty are widespread, by most accounts freedom has increased.204
Country conditions that stay poor but do not affirmatively worsen
are not sufficient to meet the changed country conditions stan-
dard.205  Furthermore, an IJ may consider an argument that an abil-
ity to be deported suffices for changed country conditions to be
198. Averianova v. Holder, 592 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses are not violated where an alien filing a
motion to reopen is permitted to use only the changed country standards rather
than the changed personal circumstances standard); see also Hui Zheng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 647, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2009).
199. Matter of S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. at 252.
200. See generally Weaver & Whitefield, supra note 2 (describing the ramifi-
cations of President Obama’s agreement with Cuba for Cubans with final orders of
removal).
201. Id.
202. Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
change in U.S. asylum law does not count as “changed country conditions”).
203. Zengerle, supra note 112.
204. See Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 1–2 (indicating
the Cuban government has released a number of political prisoners, did not com-
mit any unlawful killings, and committed no politically motivated disappearances).
205. See Mejia-Ramaja v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 19, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2015) (reasoning
that while conditions in Guatemala are very poor, they have not worsened since
the original hearing).
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contrary to public policy.206  A Cuban with a final order of removal
may evaluate the strength of a motion to reopen based on changed
country conditions in addition to other options because public pol-
icy concerns weaken that argument.  When making a motion to reo-
pen, an immigrant may also consider trying to reach an agreement
with the DHS, citing exceptional circumstances.207
2. Standards for Asylum
Cubans looking to succeed in their motions to reopen for a
fear-based claim must make a prima facie case for the relief they
seek.208  To qualify for asylum, an immigrant must meet the defini-
tion of “refugee” under the INA,209 meaning the immigrant is cur-
rently present in the United States and has “well-founded fear” of
persecution210 on account of a protected ground, meaning “race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion.”211  The BIA defines persecution as “harm or suffer-
ing inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for
possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor sought to over-
come,” and it must be “inflicted either by the government of a
country or by persons or an organization that the government was
unwilling or unable to control.”212  The Supreme Court determined
that “well-founded fear” of persecution may include having a less
than 50 percent chance of the persecution occurring.213  Further-
more, an IJ’s finding of past persecution creates a presumption of
future fear of persecution,214 rebuttable by the DHS with evidence
of changed country circumstances that show the fear is no longer
well founded.215
206. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (explaining that “motions
for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as
are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discov-
ered evidence.  This is especially true in a deportation proceeding . . . .”).
207. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (2014); see supra Part III.B.
208. Matter of S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 252 (B.I.A. 2007); see also Poradis-
ova v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005).
209. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Matter of Acosta 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).  The BIA noted
that Congress intentionally did not statutorily define “persecution” because it was
defined by case law. Id. at 223.  Thus, different circuits may have slightly varied
interpretations. See, e.g., Regalado-Garvia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir.
2002) (defining persecution as “infliction of death, torture, or injury to one’s per-
son or freedom on account of” a protected ground).
213. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
214. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014).
215. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
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In addition to meeting the above criteria, the IJ must make a
favorable judgment of discretion to grant asylum.216 In doing so, the
IJ looks at the “totality of the circumstances”217 and weighs asylum
applicants’ positive factors against their negative factors.218
3. Statutory Bars to Asylum
Finally, asylum applicants must contend with the statutory bars
to asylum.  These bars include access to a “safe third country,”219
noncompliance with the one-year filing deadline,220 previous asy-
lum denial,221 participation in the persecution of others,222 convic-
tions for “particularly serious crimes,”223 “serious nonpolitical
crimes” committed outside of the United States,224 “danger to the
security of the United States,”225 and “firm resettlement” in a third
country.226
The one-year filing deadline has two exceptions.227  The first
exception is the existence of “changed circumstances” materially af-
fecting the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.”228  The second excep-
tion is “extraordinary circumstances” not intentionally created by
the applicant that directly bear on one’s ability to apply.”229  Be-
cause Cubans with a final order of removal will have already had to
demonstrate changed country conditions to succeed in a motion to
reopen,230 they will have already satisfied the requirements for
changed conditions to overcome this bar.
Cubans who were active in the Castros’ government might
have to contend with the asylum bar for persecution of others.231
To be barred on this ground, an IJ must find that the asylum appli-
cant persecuted others based upon a protected ground.232  The asy-
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2014).
217. Id.
218. See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (B.I.A. 1987). See also
Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004).
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
220. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, §601, 101 Stat. 3009-546.
221. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(C)–(D) (2012).
222. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).
223. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
224. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).
225. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
227. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)–(5) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)–(5) (2014).
228. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(4), 1208.4(a)(4).
229. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(5), 1208.4(a)(5).
230. See supra Part III.B.
231. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).
232. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Gonzalez, 221 F. App’x 595, 596 (9th Cir. 2009).
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lum applicant need not have directly participated in the actual
persecution; peripheral involvement is sometimes enough to meet
the standards for the bar.233  The Cuban government continues to
persecute its citizens, especially for political opinion, so Cuban de-
fectors to the United States, who were high-ranking members of the
government, might be barred from asylum as persecutors.234
The class of sympathetic Cubans, who committed non-violent
crimes decades ago, might also have to contend with the particu-
larly serious crime bar because of the wide scope of crimes the bar
includes.235  If the asylum applicant has a conviction, the IJ will ana-
lyze the “nature of the crime and not the likelihood of future seri-
ous misconduct.”236
An IJ considers an asylum applicant who committed an aggra-
vated felony237 to have per se committed a particularly serious
crime.238  Furthermore, any conviction involving drug trafficking of
a controlled substance239 is a particularly serious crime.240  A Cu-
ban with a prior drug trafficking conviction can rebut the presump-
tion that it was a particularly serious crime by meeting six
criteria.241
(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very mod-
est amount of money paid for the drugs in the offending transac-
tion; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the alien of the
criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the absence of
any violence or threat of violence, implicit, or otherwise, associ-
ated with the offence; (5) the absence of any organized crime or
terrorist organization involvement, direct or indirect, in relation
to the offending activity; (6) the absence of any adverse or harm-
ful effect of the activity or transaction on juveniles.242
The above standard to rebut the presumption is quite high, but
Cubans with non-violent drug offenses from years or decades ago
should evaluate whether they meet the criteria243 and whether evi-
dence still exists to support their claims.
233. See, e.g., Matter of A-H-, 23, I. & N. Dec. 774, 784 (B.I.A. 2005) (finding
that an asylum applicant was barred as a persecutor because he used his position of
influence, public statements, and ties to government groups to incite persecution).
234. See Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 1, 5, 9–10.
235. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).
236. Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007).
237. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43).
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
240. Matters of Y-L, A-G-, R-S-R, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274–76 (B.I.A. 2002).
241. Id. at 275–76.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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Even crimes that are not aggravated felonies or drug traffick-
ing crimes may be considered particularly serious crimes, including
but not limited to reckless endangerment,244 robbery,245 mail
fraud,246 and money laundering.247  Cubans with a conviction for a
similar offense will have to argue that the facts and circumstances
of the conviction do not rise to the level of being particularly seri-
ous.248  If Cubans with final orders of removal do not meet the high
statutory standards for asylum, they should consider if they meet
the standards for Withholding of Removal and protection under the
CAT.
4. Standards for Withholding of Removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)
Withholding of Removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)249 is a
form of fear-based relief that prevents immediate removal to one’s
home country, but with fewer immigration benefits than asylum.250
An IJ considers the immigrant’s eligibility for Withholding of Re-
moval alongside the asylum application.251  The legal elements for
asylum and Withholding of Removal are the same, and an immi-
grant similarly has to prove persecution on the basis of one of the
enumerated protected grounds:  race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or particular social group.252  However, there are signifi-
cant differences between asylum and Withholding of Removal.253
The first major distinction is that immigrants granted With-
holding of Removal still have a final order of removal on their
records, even though they cannot be deported.254  Immigrants that
were granted Withholding of Removal are also prohibited from
traveling out of the United States and are not permitted to apply
for citizenship.255
244. Nethangani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2008).
245. Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 361 (B.I.A. 1986).
246. Arbid v. Holder, 674 F.3d 1138, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2012).
247. Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 267–68 (3d Cir. 2010).
248. Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 337–38 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding
that “a particularly serious crime need not be an aggravated felony. . . . [A]ll relia-
ble information may be considered . . . including but not limited to the record of
conviction and sentencing information.”).
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).
250. Id.
251. I-589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, supra note
192.
252. Id.
253. See DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 1031 (7th ed. 2015).
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
255. COLLOPY, supra note 253.
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Next, the burden of proof is higher for Withholding of Re-
moval compared to asylum; applicants must prove that the requisite
harm is a “clear probability”256 instead of the “well-founded fear”
standard for asylum.257  Although the burden of proof is higher, IJs
may not exercise discretion in granting Withholding of Removal as
they do in granting asylum; the IJ must mandatorily grant relief if
the applicant meets the statutory standard.258  Finally, three of the
statutory bars to asylum do not apply to applicants for Withholding
of Removal:  the one-year filing bar,259 a previously denied applica-
tion for asylum,260 and the possibility of removal to a “safe third
country.”261  The remaining bars to asylum still apply to Withhold-
ing of Removal, including the immigrant’s participation in persecu-
tion based upon a protected ground,262 commitment of a
“particularly serious crime”263 or a “serious nonpolitical crime” in a
different country,264 and participation in terrorist activity.265
5. Possible Solutions for Cubans Under Asylum and Withholding
of Removal Standards
Cuban applicants for asylum or Withholding of Removal are
unlikely to succeed on a claim of persecution for race because the
Cuban government openly propagates racial equality, even if it has
not achieved such equality.266  Additionally, a claim for persecution
on account of nationality is unlikely to succeed because although
Cuba is ethnically diverse and discrimination does occur, the gov-
ernment officially condemns such discrimination and does not ac-
quiesce to discriminatory groups.267  An asylum claim based on
persecution for religion is similarly unlikely; although there are in-
256. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2014).  Another common phrasing of the “clear
probability” standard for Withholding of Removal is that the persecution is “more
likely than not.” See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
258. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429.
259. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
260. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(C)–(D).
261. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
262. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).
263. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  For Withholding of Re-
moval, the particularly serious crime analysis differs slightly because an aggravated
felony is only per se a particularly serious crime if the aggregate sentence imposed
was at least five years.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2012).
264. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).
266. See Damien Cave, Cuba Says it has Solved Racism. Obama Isn’t so Sure,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2j2CEYh.
267. Id. The indigenous people of Cuba, the Tainos, were almost eradicated
by colonialism. See Hillary Guelly, Searching for Cuba’s Pre-Columbian Roots,
THE SMITHSONIAN (Nov. 1, 2016), http://bit.ly/2eCsa2B.  Although the government
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stances of the Cuban government threatening certain groups, like
Evangelical Christians, “there were no reports of significant societal
actions affecting religious freedom,” and the Cuban Constitution
provides for freedom of religion.268  However, a Cuban immigrant
may have other grounds for a successful asylum or Withholding of
Removal claim.
a. Political Opinion
An asylum or Withholding of Removal claim based upon polit-
ical opinion, however, is likely to be viable on a case-by-case basis
for Cubans due to the Cuban government’s past and present treat-
ment of political dissidents.269  As stated previously, past persecu-
tion creates a rebuttable presumption for continued persecution.270
Therefore, Cubans who were previously incarcerated or tortured
due to their support for Batista, their membership in a group like
Damas de Blanco,271 or other political dissidence, may establish
that rebuttable presumption for persecution.272  The DHS may try
to rebut that presumption, but governmental persecution continues
under President Raul Castro, even if it has lessened.273
b. Particular Social Group
Next, Cubans may be eligible for asylum or Withholding of Re-
moval on the basis of persecution due to membership in a particular
social group.274  “Particular social group” is not defined in legisla-
tion, but the UNHCR handbook offers the following definition:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other
than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society.  The characteristic will often be one which is
innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to iden-
tity, conscience or the exercise of human rights.275
encourages a post-racial society, it has recently become more accepting to expres-
sion of indigenous pride and culture. Id.
268. See generally Cuba International Religious Freedom Report, supra note
59.
269. See Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 2, 9–10.
270. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014).
271. See supra note 57.
272. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
273. See Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 2, 9–10.
274. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A) (2012).
275. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶
11 (May 7, 2002), http://bit.ly/2khRfEb.
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The BIA clarified that a characteristic of a particular social group
“must be one that the members of the group either cannot change,
or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences,” and they should share “a
common, immutable characteristic.”276
Cubans have previously won immigration relief by defining a
particular social group with homosexuality.277  A Cuban using ho-
mosexuality as a basis for asylum will have to show that the Cuban
government still uses homosexuality as a basis for persecution and
will likely have a hard time doing so given recent progress.278  An-
other possibility for a particular social group may be HIV positive
individuals because Cuba often fails to administer the proper medi-
cations to treat HIV and even criminalizes having the disease.279  In
an unpublished decision, an IJ previously recognized HIV status as
a particular social group.280
Cubans with final orders of removal that have a fear of govern-
ment persecution upon return to Cuba should particularly consider
applying for asylum and Withholding of Removal for political opin-
ion or particular social group, depending on their individual
circumstances.
6. Protection Under the Convention Against Torture
In the same application for asylum, immigrants may apply for
protection under the CAT.  The CAT provides for two types of pro-
tection, withholding of removal281 and deferral of removal.282
Under the CAT, applicants are eligible for protection if they
establish that they were intentionally283 tortured by a government
official or with the acquiescence of the government284 in the of-
fender’s custody or physical control.285  The legal analysis for pro-
276. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
277. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990)
(noting that no challenge was brought to the “immutable” nature of
homosexuality).
278. Cuba’s Gay Rights Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), http://
nyti.ms/2kgc3Ia.
279. Cuba 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 55, at 26.
280. IJ Grants Asylum to HIV Positive Man, General Counsel Issues HIV In-
structions, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 901 (July 8, 1996) (granting asylum to an
HIV positive man who would face stigma and a de facto death sentence due to
unavailability of medication in his home country in an unpublished, non-binding
decision).
281. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2014).
282. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17, 1208.17.
283. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(5), 1208.18(a)(5).
284. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.19(a)(1), 1208.18(a)(1).
285. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b), 1208.16(b).
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tection under the CAT is distinct from that for asylum and
Withholding of Removal because the torture does not have to be
done on account of a protected ground.286  The burden of proof is
that the immigrants will “more likely than not” be tortured if they
are removed to his country of origin.287
Withholding of removal under the CAT is similar in many ways
to Withholding of Removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), including
the statutory bars to removal.288  Additionally, the IJ does not have
discretion in granting withholding of removal under the CAT if the
applicant meets the criteria,289 and the applicant receives the same
benefits as he would with Withholding of Removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3).290
Deferral of removal under the CAT differs in that there are no
statutory bars to its protection.291  It is also a less permanent form
of protection because the DHS may initiate proceedings where the
recipient of referral of removal must prove again that he meets the
requirements of protection under the CAT.292
A Cuban immigrant should consider applying for protection
under the CAT if he or she is statutorily barred from asylum and
Withholding of Removal293 or if he or she is unable to establish that
the persecution occurred on account of a protected ground.294
IV. CONCLUSION
The DHS’s sudden ability to deport 34,000 foreign nationals
with final orders of removal is an unprecedented circumstance.295
Therefore, the DHS should exercise its discretion with the intention
to minimize governmental and human costs, while ensuring that the
most dangerous criminals are removed from the United States.296
The DHS should comply with its previously identified priorities to
humanely exercise its discretion.297  Furthermore, the DHS should
286. Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 279–99 (B.I.A. 2002).
287. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 1208.16(c).
288. See supra Part.III.C.3.
289. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(4), 1208.16(c)(4).
290. See supra Part III.C.4.
291. See, e.g., Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 368 (B.I.A. 2002) (noting
that the IJ may not deny protection under the CAT because of any statutory bar,
“however serious” the criminal convictions might be).
292. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17(d), 1208.17(d).
293. See supra Part III.C.3.
294. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(6), 1208.18(a)(6).
295. See Joint Statement, supra note 2; see also Alvarez & Hussey, supra note
3.
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See supra Part III.A.
740 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:707
comply with joint motions to reopen immigration cases where
Cubans have non-violent, years-old convictions and consider the
situation an exceptional circumstance.298
Cubans with final orders of removal and non-violent convic-
tions should carefully weigh their options in challenging the orders.
If they meet DHS criteria, they should proactively seek
prosecutorial discretion or file a joint motion to reopen from
DHS.299  They should also review their original immigration and
criminal proceedings to determine whether their lawyers ade-
quately advised them of the immigration consequences of their
crimes.300  Finally, Cubans with final orders of removal should con-
sider whether they have been persecuted in the past or face future
persecution and apply for fear-based protection if applicable.301
298. See supra Part III.B.
299. See supra Parts III.A–B.
300. See supra Part III.B.
301. See supra Part III.C.
